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From Strength to Strength: A Comment on Morley
and Sitkoff’s Making Directed Trusts Work
James P. Spica*
I. INTRODUCTION
Accessory to Professors Morley and Sitkoff’s admirable outline of
the Uniform Directed Trust Act (UDTA),1 this Comment describes two
ways in which a state that has been forward to adopt the UDTA, viz.
Michigan,2 has modified the act en route.3 These modifications operate
in disparate parts of the act: one limits the circumstances in which a
trustee subject to direction can be liable to trust beneficiaries for doing
as directed; the other limits the class of persons eligible to direct. But
both strengthen the same, signal virtue of the UDTA, which is that the
act increases a settlor’s ability to insulate a “directed trustee” from liability for following improvident directions.4
II. MARKET INCENTIVES

FOR

PRICE DIFFERENTIATION

That is a virtue because it allows professional trustees to take the
settlor’s division of administrative labor seriously as a scheme of fiduciary-risk allocation at a time when professional trust-service providers
are increasingly being asked by settlors to reduce their standard fees in
light of allocations of administrative responsibilities to holders of powers to direct: the settlor reasons that the power holder will assume responsibility for the directed function and that, because following
directions is less onerous than exercising discretion, the directed professional trustee’s standard fee should be adjusted.
* Member, Dickinson Wright PLLC, Detroit. The author, an ACTEC Fellow and
Uniform Law Commissioner, served as the American Bar Association Advisor to the
ULC’s Directed Trust Drafting Committee and is Chair of the Divided and Directed
Trusteeships Committee of the Council of the Probate and Estate Planning Section of the
State Bar of Michigan.
1 John D. Morley & Robert H. Sitkoff, Making Directed Trusts Work: The Uniform
Directed Trust Act, 44 ACTEC L.J. 3 (2019).
2 See 2018 Mich. Pub. Act Nos. 663, 664 (effective Mar. 29, 2019).
3 For a fuller account of Michigan’s modifications of the UDTA, see James P.
Spica, Used Not Only as Directed: Michigan’s Adaptation of the Uniform Directed Trust
Act, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 339, 390–99 (2019).
4 See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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But is following directions less onerous than exercising discretion?
The professional trustee will evaluate whether to cut her standard fee in
this situation by asking in what circumstances she can be liable for doing
what the settlor would have her do—follow directions. To the extent
following a direction from a power holder when the power holder is
acting within her authority under the terms of the trust will effectively
insulate the trustee from liability, the trustee can take the settlor’s division of administrative labor seriously as a scheme of fiduciary-risk allocation. But to the extent the trustee can be liable to beneficiaries for
doing exactly as directed when the power holder is acting within her
authority, the request that the trustee reduce her professional fee is a
request that she forgo compensation for risk or, equivalently, for effort
she will have to mount—in the way of vigilance over the power holder—
to avoid risk.
III. FIDUCIARY RISK
At common law and under the Uniform Trust Code, a trustee has
an ineradicable duty to balk at a direction, even if the direction is formally within the director’s authority under the terms of the trust, if the
trustee has reason to know that the direction so contravenes the purposes of the trust or interests of trust beneficiaries as to constitute an
abuse.5 The UDTA changes that,6 and so does Michigan’s version of the
UDTA (MUDTA),7 but not in the same way. Under the default rules of
the MUDTA,8 if an exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction that
is within the power holder’s authority under the terms of the trust turns
out to be improvident, a directed trustee can only be liable for complying “if the exercise or nonexercise was obtained with the directed trustee’s collusion or by the directed trustee’s fraud.”9 The standard under
the default rules of the UDTA is different:
[A] directed trustee shall take reasonable action to comply
with a trust director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of
direction . . . and the trustee is not liable for the action [provided, however, that] [a] directed trustee must not comply with
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003); UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (enacted in Michigan as MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.7105(2)(b) (2018)).
6 See UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 9 legislative note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
7 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7105(2)(b) (2019).
8 The standards for directed-trustee liability set by the UDTA and the MUDTA are
minimum standards: the settlor is free under both regimes to require more of a directed
trustee than is required by the default rules. See UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 9(e);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7105(1) (based on UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a)).
9 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7703a(7).
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a trust director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction . . . to the extent that by complying the trustee would engage in willful misconduct.10
The ULC Comment to the provision just quoted makes it clear that
conduct sufficient to trigger directed-trustee liability under the UDTA’s
willful-misconduct standard may consist entirely in complying with a sufficiently egregious exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction:
[B]ecause a trustee stands at the center of a trust, the trustee
must bear at least some duty even if the trustee is acting under
the direction of a director. Although the settlor could have
made the trust director the sole trustee, the settlor did not actually do so—and under traditional understandings of trust
law, a trustee must always be accountable to a beneficiary in
some way.11
The UDTA’s willful-misconduct standard thus makes a stark contrast to the MUDTA’s collusion-or-fraud-in-obtaining-exercise-or-nonexercise standard: under the uniform act, the quality of a particular
exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction can determine whether a
directed trustee may be liable to trust beneficiaries for complying;
whereas under the default rules of the MUDTA, following a direction
that was not procured by the directed trustee’s own affirmative misconduct will never in itself expose a directed trustee to liability for breach of
trust.12 Under both the UDTA and the MUDTA, a directed trustee is
free to question (and convey her reservations regarding) the appropriateness of a particular exercise or nonexercise of a power13 and she can
seek a court order directing her to comply, temporize, or resist.14 The
difference is that under the default rules of the UDTA, but not those of
the MUDTA, a trustee may be liable for failing to do one or more of
those things based on a claim that the exercise or nonexercise in question is such that merely by complying the trustee engaged in willful
misconduct.15
But when is the exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction
such that mere compliance will involve a directed trustee in willful misconduct? We learn from a ULC Comment that a trust director’s unreasonableness in the exercise or nonexercise of a power is not in itself
10

See UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 9(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
See id. § 9(a)–(b) cmt. b (emphasis added).
12 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13 See UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 11(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.7703a(11)–(12) (2019).
14 See UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 9(d); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.1302(b)(vi),
700.7203(1).
15 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
11
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sufficient to condemn compliance.16 So, we have to ask what it is in
addition to or, perhaps, apart from unreasonableness that will so mar a
trust director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power as to proclaim a responsive trustee’s obedience “willful misconduct.” One searches the
UDTA and the ULC Comments in vain for an answer.
Morley and Sitkoff have given an account of that lack of guidance
that will hardly reassure the professional trustee who is being asked to
reduce her standard fee in light the settlor’s allocation of administrative
responsibilities to trust directors: the ULC drafting committee, they tell
us, “decided to preserve room for judges to elaborate the willful misconduct standard in application.”17 To that extent, the MUDTA must compare favorably with the uniform act as an inducement for the
professional trustee to credit the settlor’s division of administrative labor as a scheme of fiduciary-risk allocation; for the UDTA is designedly
vague as to the circumstances in which a directed trustee can be liable to
trust beneficiaries for doing exactly as directed by a trust director who is
acting within her authority under the trust instrument.
IV. STATE REGULATION

OF

ENTITY TRUST POWERS

The UDTA counterpoises increasing the settlor’s ability to insulate
directed trustees from liability with conservation of aggregate fiduciary
responsibility: by assimilating trust directors to trustees for purposes of
imposing duties and liabilities on such directors,18 the UDTA ensures
that the beneficiaries of a trust are always owed at least the fiduciary
duties they would be owed if the trust in question made no provision for
a trust director.19 But the practical value of that assurance is liable to be
affected by the sorts of persons permitted to act as trust directors; it is
liable to be depreciated if the UDTA allows, for example, a thinly capitalized limited liability company to be created for the purpose of accepting a trust directorship in a state in which, but for enactment of the
UDTA, such a company would not be permitted to exercise the relevant
powers of direction.
Other than natural persons, the only persons permitted to exercise
trust powers in Michigan are corporations authorized to do so in one of
several ways enumerated in the Michigan Banking Code.20 One way,
the catch-all, is for “[a] nonbanking corporation [to] be specifically authorized to act as fiduciary in [Michigan] by another statute of [Michi16

See UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 9 cmt. a.
See Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 43.
18 See, e.g., UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT §§ 8(a), 16; MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 700.7703a(5), (21).
19 See UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
20 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.11105(2) (2018).
17
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gan].”21 Now, the UDTA (1) permits a settlor to “grant a power of
direction to a trust director,”22 (2) subjects “trust directors” to personal
jurisdiction23 and to “fiduciary dut[ies]” in respect of their “powers of
direction,”24 (3) defines “trust director” as a “person . . . granted a
power of direction,”25 and (4) defines “person” to include legal entities
such as corporations.26 Thus, wholesale adoption of the UDTA in Michigan could have been interpreted as authorizing nonbanking organizations to exercise trust powers pursuant to the terms of trusts granting
powers of direction.27
In Michigan, that interpretation could have affected the process of
enactment; for the Michigan Constitution requires a supermajority in
both houses of the State legislature for the enactment of any “general
law providing for the incorporation of trust companies or . . . regulating
the business thereof.”28 But the interpretation also threatens, in the way
suggested above, the practical significance of conservation of aggregate
fiduciary responsibility. For that reason (as well as the possible constitutional complication), the MUDTA limits the entities to which a settlor
may grant powers of direction to those otherwise authorized by Michigan law to act as trustees: “‘Trust director’ means an organization permitted to exercise trust powers in this state as described in section
1105(2) of the Banking Code of 1999, 1999 PA 276, or an individual, if
that person is granted a power of direction . . . .”29
V. CONCLUSION
That limitation strengthens the principle of conservation of aggregate fiduciary responsibly as internal support for allowing settlors to insulate directed trustees from liability for following directions. And by
clarifying—and presumably increasing—the maximum protection settlors can provide against such liability, the MUDTA’s collusion-orfraud-in-obtaining-exercise-or-nonexercise standard strengthens the
act’s inducement for professional trust-service providers to credit settlors’ divisions of administrative labor as schemes of fiduciary-risk allocation and to assess market incentives for price differentiation
21

See id. § 487.11105(2)(e).
UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 6(a) (and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7703a(3)).
23 See id. § 15 (and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7703a(20)).
24 See id. § 8(a) (and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7703a(5)).
25 See id. § 2(9) (and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7703a(24)(f)) (emphasis added).
26 See id. § 2(4) (and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1106(n) (defining “person” to include individuals and organizations)).
27 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.11105(2) (2018).
28 MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 43 (1963).
29 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7703a(24)(f); see also id. § 700.1106(n) (defining
“person”).
22
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accordingly. Thus, both of the modifications we have described here can
be viewed—as they have been viewed in Michigan—as adding strength
to the UDTA’s strength.

